

Free allowance allocation under the EU ETS


The Economics, Politics and Future of Subsidies Workshop,

Berlin, 12 November 2009


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Commission




The EU Climate Change and Energy Package: Political context

- Overall objective: limit temperature increase to 2°C (3.6°F) above pre-industrial level
 - European Council March 2007: 20/20/20 by 2020
 - Climate & Energy Package of legislation agreed in December 2008
 - EU offer to Copenhagen: 30% emission reduction
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Primary feature of the new ETS: A robust EU-wide cap beyond 2020



- Linear factor to be reviewed by 2025
- Aviation to be included; will change figures correspondingly, but cap not reduced
- Disclaimer: all figures are provisional and do not account for new sectors in third period

- Fully harmonised allocation rules
 - Auctioning is default allocation method
 - Free allocation on basis of ambitious ex-ante benchmark for those sectors receiving free allocation
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Harmonised free allocation rules


- Community-wide harmonisation → No state aid risk, no distortion of competition
- Maximum determined by relative share of 2005-2007 industry's verified emissions
- Phasing out
 - On basis of ambitious ex-ante benchmarks
 - For sectors deemed not exposed to risk of carbon leakage: 80% in 2013 to 30% by 2020
 - For sectors deemed exposed to risk of carbon leakage: 100%
 - With a view to reaching full auctioning in 2027
- In the light of the outcome of the international negotiations, a report accompanied by any appropriate proposals (adjustment of level of free allocation, review of the carbon leakage list)

Ambitious


- Average performance of 10% most efficient installations
- Taking account of the most efficient techniques, substitutes, alternative production processes, high efficiency cogeneration, efficient energy recovery of waste gases, use of biomass and capture and storage of CO₂

Ex-ante

- Allocations fixed prior to the trading period to enable the market to function properly
- Benchmarks to be multiplied with historic production to get amount of free allowances



Why not ex-post benchmarking?

- Acts like an output subsidy
 - Reduces the incentive for emission reductions
 - Puts at serious risk the absolute cap
 - Adds very substantial and continuous administrative burden, requiring competition sensitive data
 - Creates significant uncertainty on the amount of free allocation for individual companies
 - Makes the carbon market more volatile
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