Tag Archives: climate change

EU winter package brings renewables in from the cold

December 1, 2016 |

 

Joint press conference by Maroš Šefčovič and Miguel Arias Cañete on the adoption of a Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy

Christmas came early yesterday in Brussels, with the release of some heavy reading for the EU’s parliamentarians to digest over the festive season. Or at least that was the more jovial take on the launch of the EU winter package from Maroš Šefčovič, the EU vice-president in charge of the Energy Union (pictured).

Targets to cut energy use 30% by 2030, the phasing out of coal subsidies and regional cooperation on energy trading are central to the proposals, which updates the regulations and directives that support targets set out in 2014 as part of the Energy Package 2030.

Whether this gift is not just for Christmas will be down to the EU parliamentarians who have two years to debate these proposals and implement them.

So where does it leave us with the growth of renewables, the underpinning for a decarbonised power sector? If the EU meets its 2030 target, 50% of electricity should be renewable compared with an EU average of 29% today. That target remains unchanged, so those engaged in producing clean energy for Europe’s electricity grid should be reassured – up to a point.

A great deal was made of scrapping priority dispatch for renewables after that proposed change was ‘leaked’. In the end, the Commission merely soften its language but the outcome remains the same on priority dispatch, implying that policymakers think that renewable generation should be more responsive to the market.

Yesterday, Šefčovič and the Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete both acknowledged that renewables need to be more integrated into wholesale markets, and those markets need to be more coordinated with each-other. Specifically, the package encourages member states to:

  • ensure that renewables participate in wholesale and balancing markets on a “level playing field” with other technologies. In particular, the new package removes the requirement for renewables to be given priority dispatch over other generation types (which most, but not all, member states currently abide by). It instead requires dispatch which is “non-discriminatory and market based”, with a few exceptions such as small-scale renewables (<500kW). In addition, renewables should face balancing risk and participate in wholesale and balancing markets.
  • increase integration between national electricity markets across the EU. Requirements include opening national capacity auctions to cross-border participation and an interconnection target of 15% by 2030 (ie, connecting 15% of installed electricity production capacity with neighbouring regions and countries). Earlier this year, the Commission established an expert group to guide member states and regions through this process.

What does this all mean for investors? The obvious concern is that removal of priority dispatch and exposure to balancing markets will increase revenue risk for renewables generators.

So, why is the EU removing these rules on priority dispatch once the mainstay of the Commission’s wholesale market rules? The main argument is to help reduce the costs of balancing supply and demand, and managing network constraints. Generally, it is most economic to dispatch renewables first because their running costs are close to zero regardless of whether they have priority dispatch.

But, when there is surplus generation, the most economic option is sometimes to curtail renewables ahead of other plant. For example, turning down an inflexible gas plant only to restart and ramp it up a few hours later can be expensive and inefficient. By contrast, wind generators can be turned down relatively easily.

Therefore, giving renewables priority dispatch can sometimes increase the overall costs of managing the system. When renewables were a small part of the market, any inefficiencies caused by priority dispatch were small and easy to ignore, while it helped reduce risks around renewables investment. But now renewables are set to become the dominant part of electricity markets it is harder to ignore.

Nevertheless, risks around balancing for wind can cause real headaches for investors. In our report from earlier this year, Policy and investment in German renewable energy we found that economic curtailment could increase significantly, potentially adding 17% to onshore wind costs by 2020.

The amount a generator is curtailed depends on a wide range of uncertain factors which wind investors have little or no control over (eg, electricity demand, international energy planning, network developments and future curtailment rules).

What could happen next?

So to maintain investor confidence (and avoid costly lawsuits) existing renewables investments need to be financially protected as rules are changed. There are many ways to do this. For example, priority dispatch status could be grandfathered for existing generators (as the winter package suggests) or, as set out in our recent report of Germany, generators could be fully compensated for curtailment through “take-or-pay” arrangements.

More generally, very clear rules around plant dispatch and curtailment are needed to avoid deterring investment. Ideally, dispatch will be determined by competitive, well-functioning balancing markets, where renewables are paid to be turned down based on what they offer, rather than by a central system operator curtailing without compensation.

The move to integrate renewables into balancing markets means they will compete with other options to balance the system such as storage and demand-side measures. These flexibility options should benefit from the sharper price signals and greater interconnection implied by winter package. But there is no clear consensus yet on the right business and regulatory models to support investment in flexibility. However, CPI is currently working on a programme as part of the Energy Transitions Commission to explore the role of flexibility in a modern, decarbonised grid and will be publishing our findings soon.

Ultimately, there is an unavoidable trade-off in designing electricity markets: it is very difficult to provide incentives for generators, storage and the demand-side to dispatch efficiently through market mechanisms without also exposing them to some risk. Yesterday’s announcement in the winter package means more countries will have to face this dilemma.

Disclaimer: Unless otherwise stated, the information in this blog is not supported by CPI evidence-based content. Views expressed are those of the author.

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Three ways international development partners can help Indonesia solve its land use challenges

February 24, 2016 | and

 

At least 25 major aid organizations have been actively engaged in efforts to reduce Indonesia’s greenhouse gas emissions from land use over the last five years. Several of these funders, including the UK Climate Change Unit Indonesia, and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, have even refocused a large portion of their programs in Indonesia on the land use challenge.

Photo credit: Elysha Rom-Povolo

Photo credit: Elysha Rom-Povolo

This sharp focus isn’t surprising when you take into account that 44% of global land use and forestry emissions came from Indonesia in 2012 Last year saw unprecedented emissions from forest and peat fires in Indonesia, with emissions from fires alone expected to reach around 1750 MtCO2-eq., which is almost equal to Indonesia’s entire greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors in 2012.

The involvement of many international development organizations is also good news given that the Government of Indonesia has sent strong signals to the international community that their support is needed. Indonesia has committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26% by 2020, scaling up to 29% by 2030, and further extending their ambition to 41% with international support. Around 90% of that target is anticipated to come from reducing deforestation and peat emissions.

The question is, have the efforts been working?

We recently took on this question in a study that looked at international public climate finance flows to land use from major development partners, “Taking Stock of International Contributions to Low Carbon, Climate Resilient Land Use in Indonesia.”

We found mixed results.

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Reforming fiscal policies to remedy land use woes

January 11, 2016 | and

 

This post was originally published by the Jakarta Post.

President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration has been busy this year, announcing several new policy packages to strengthen the economy in a few months. Then in November the President declared a radical shift in peatland management, with policies designed to halt agricultural expansion into peat forests while facilitating the rehabilitation of already degraded peatlands.

In December, Indonesia made a commitment at the Paris climate change negotiations to reduce emissions by 29 percent by 2030.

This tension between economic growth and environmental protection requires skillful balancing across Indonesia’s economy and particularly, in the expanding agriculture sector.

The proposed economic packages offer tried and true approaches to encouraging business growth. But they lack consideration of how fiscal adjustments could encourage environmental protection while encouraging growth.

Our analysis shows big potential, uncovering inefficiencies in fiscal policies in the land use sector, and suggesting that reforms in this area may be a win-win for better, cleaner growth.

For example, currently, 93.5 percent of all government revenue related to land use comes from levies based on production volume instead of land size.

The more you produce, the more you pay, and there are neither penalties nor rewards to use less land. Only for the land and building tax and a few state taxes are levied in proportion to land used — the more land in play, the more tax you pay.

However, even these taxes create little correlation between the value of the land and the amount paid. So, for now, with land undertaxed, businesses have every reason to use more land to increase production, rather than improving the productivity of land already in play.

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Changing land use patterns in Brazil

October 29, 2015 | and

 

As the demand for food and climate change risk both increase, a new study explores paths to more efficient land use in the country.

As Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff promised to reduce Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions by 43 per cent by 2030. Brazil became the first major developing country to pledge an absolute reduction in emissions over the next fifteen years. Since the country is an agricultural leader with abundant natural resources, it clearly has many challenges ahead. One of the questions that arises is whether it is possible to simultaneously promote economic growth and improve ecosystem protection within Brazil’s rural landscape.

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Indonesia’s INDC – A step forward or a missed opportunity?

September 28, 2015 |

 

 

Indonesia submits its INDC

As the Paris climate negotiations draw closer, countries have been asked to submit their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions – INDCs – by 1 October. INDCs identify the actions a government intends to take as the basis of post-2020 global emissions reduction commitments, that will be included in the future climate agreement. The process of setting the INDC is bottom-up and country-led, in contrast to the top-down approach of the Kyoto Protocol. INDCs already submitted have been heavily scrutinized and judged for the level of ambition or leadership.

Given the importance of the INDCs as a way for nations to take stock of their goals and needs and to chart paths towards an ambitious outcome in Paris, our question here is whether Indonesia has taken full advantage of this opportunity to close the gaps in existing and newly proposed policy frameworks, to pave the way for a prosperous, decarbonized economy.

Baselines – going back to the drawing board

Indonesia is presenting its INDC as a deviation from business as usual using projections based on the historical trajectory (2000-2010). It assumes projected increases in the energy sector in the absence of mitigation actions, however details of these assumptions and how they are modelled have not been disclosed in the INDC document.

As Indonesia’s INDC sets out a 26% emission reduction by 2020 and 29% emission reduction by 2030 based on a 2010 projected business as usual scenario, at a glance, this seems to imply that the first target was very ambitious, or perhaps that the new one, which adds a further 3% over the next 10 years, is hedging bets. It could also imply that the Government of Indonesia has calculated the variables with extra care and has set a more realistic target. In any case, because inventory and monitoring systems have not been able to estimate progress to date, it is hard to decipher where Indonesia stands with respect to business as usual and where they could go.

Casting more light on this situation in the latest inventory, and outlining in detail the baseline as well as assumptions and modelling underlying it, for each sector, would add credibility to Indonesia’s upcoming Third National Communication to UNFCCC in 2016.

Capitalizing on low hanging fruits

Since forestry emissions (from land and land use change, as well as peat and forest fires) as per Indonesia’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC of 2010 account for 63% of the emissions profile, a landscape-scale ecosystem management approach, emphasizing the role of sub-national jurisdictions to decarbonize the economy, could be highly relevant to Indonesia. The INDC document describes its strategic approach as recognizing that climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts are inherently multi-sectoral in nature and require an integrated approach. However current on-going efforts, such as the moratorium on the clearing of primary forests, are not enough to curtail rising pressures on land. Increased palm oil production and the recent push for expanding markets for biodiesel, upcoming food security programs which open one million hectares of new paddy fields, and 35 GW of power to be installed by 2019 – much of it coal based, while all important to Indonesia’s growing economy, could threaten Indonesia’s sustainability goals if not managed properly.

Climate Policy Initiative’s protection and production and land management approach (PALM), applied in applied in Central Kalimantan, in collaboration with the University of Palangkaraya, aims to lead the way in this regard by bringing together private, public, and smallholder-farmer stakeholders to unlock a new, collective approach to agriculture that will promote food security, energy security, socially inclusive economic development and environmental sustainability. The project has already identified opportunities to increase profitability and productivity for smallholder farmers through larger scale management in the form of cooperatives. Such opportunities reduce pressure on land, support sustainable development of the palm oil economy, and provide livelihood benefits to the smallholder community. Such initiatives could also potentially lead to quantifiable emissions reductions.

Scaling up climate finance required to deliver the INDC

The Landscape of Public Climate Finance in Indonesia conducted by the Indonesian Ministry of Finance’s Fiscal Policy Agency and CPI found that public climate finance in 2011 reached at least IDR 8.377 billion (USD 951 million). The Government of Indonesia disbursed at least IDR 5,526 billion (USD 627 million) or 66% of those flows. The finance was well targeted, with most of it flowing through to the forestry sector (73%) and laying a strong foundation for decarbonizing the economy through policy development and capacity building.

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Eight steps to improve understanding of climate finance flows in your city or country

May 21, 2015 | and

 

Understanding how much climate finance is flowing, where it comes from and how it flows to which activities and projects on the ground is not only useful at the global level to help understand progress towards climate finance goals. It can also help countries, regions, cities, and organizations to understand their progress toward meeting their own development, economic, and environmental goals by:

– Establishing a baseline against which to measure progress, reveals current patterns of investment and any blockages in the system.
– Revealing interactions between public finance and private investment which can inform decisions about how to redirect flows from business-as-usual to low-carbon and climate-resilient investments.
– Helping international partners see how they can support domestic efforts.
– Identifying opportunities to increase climate finance and providing an important basis for policymakers to develop more effective policies, particularly when combined with analysis of what is working or not in different interventions.

Climate Policy Initiative produces the most comprehensive overview of global climate finance flows available. We have also carried out in-depth mapping of climate finance flows for Germany and Indonesia. The following eight steps summarise the approach we take to map climate finance flows in different contexts. Although the process is complicated because of significant data gaps and inconsistencies, the principles behind such mapping are relatively simple. Applying them can improve understanding of climate flows. They are:

1. Decide what finance you want to measure.The first step is to decide which activities you want to focus on. For some you’ll also need to decide what makes a particular activity low-carbon or climate-resilient. This is relatively easy to do for something like renewable energy generation. However if you want to understand how much finance is flowing towards more climate-resilient, productive and sustainable land use, you will have important decisions to make on what you want to include and what you should leave out.

2. Set the geographical scale.Are you going to track finance flowing to these activities at the international, national, regional, city or organizational level?

3. Decide whether to track public finance, private investment, or both. Information on some climate finance flows (e.g. official development assistance) is easier to track than for others and there are some – like private investment in energy efficiency – where very little reliable data is available at all. But ideally a mapping exercise for a country, region, or city would include both public and private flows to the extent possible because understanding how these different sources of finance interact is essential to making best use of your financial resources.

4. Consider total investments, not just additional investment costs.Research into the additional costs of low-carbon interventions above higher-carbon alternatives is useful and has even shown that some low-carbon transitions may be cheaper than business-as-usual. But, when dealing with the practicalities of tracking and managing climate mitigation and adaptation investment for planning purposes, it is simpler to consistently track current total investment rather than additional investment costs.

5. Focus on project-level primary financing.Project-level primary financing is finance going to activities and projects on the ground and the best indicator of progress on climate action. Aggregate data does not allow the same insights as project-level data while data on secondary market transactions (e.g. refinancing, selling stocks) represents money changing hands. Such transactions can play an important role in providing project developers with capital to reinvest in further projects but they do not necessarily represent additional efforts to reduce emissions or increase climate resilience.

6. Track public framework expenditures.Many projects would be impossible without the development of national climate strategies, specific regulations and enabling environments for investment but these costs are not seen at the project level. Tracking them is important to have a real understanding of how much public finance is flowing to and needed for climate action.

7. Exclude public revenue support for projects such as feed-in tariffs and carbon credit revenues.While these revenue support mechanisms are often essential for climate action they pay back the investments made in climate-relevant projects and activities that you are already counting. Including investment costs and policy-induced revenues would therefore mean you were counting the same flows twice.

8. Exclude private investments in research and development.These are investments that private actors try to recover when selling their goods and services so counting them in addition to investment costs would, once again, mean you were counting the same flows twice.

The quality of your mapping exercise will depend on the quality of the data you have. Fragmented data in the land use sector is the reason we are working with the European Forestry Institute and Climate Focus, in an upcoming publication, to provide policymakers with a series of mapping tools to understand potential entry points for climate finance flows in their land use sectors. Often these countries are aware of the opportunities to shift from unsustainable to sustainable land use but lack financing strategies to deliver their goals. This project will help them identify which fiscal and financial mechanisms are available to unlock new investors and more efficient investments.

We are happy to assist countries, cities, or organizations looking to better understand their climate finance flows by undertaking mapping exercises, just get in touch.
 

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By the Numbers: Tracking Finance for Low-Carbon & Climate-Resilient Development

February 3, 2015 |

 

Landscape of Climate Finance 2014

 

In December 2015, countries will gather in Paris to finalize a new global agreement to tackle climate change. Decisions about how to unlock finance in support of developing countries’ low-carbon and climate-resilient development will be a central part of the talks, and understanding where the world stands in relation to these goals is a more urgent task than ever.

Climate Policy Initiative’s Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2014 offers a view of where and how climate finance is flowing, drawing together the most comprehensive information available about the scale, key actors, instruments, recipients, and uses of finance supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation outcomes.

Climate finance has fallen, mainly due to reductions in solar PV costs

Overall, the gap between the finance needed to deal with climate change and the finance delivered is growing while total climate finance has fallen for two consecutive years. This could put globally agreed temperature goals at risk and increase the likelihood of costly climate impacts.

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3 Reasons for Measured Optimism about Climate Finance

December 4, 2014 |

 

A version of this blog first appeared on Responding to Climate Change: http://www.rtcc.org/2014/11/21/three-reasons-to-be-optimistic-about-climate-finance-flows/

This year’s UN climate talks opened in Lima earlier this week and for those who hope the world can avoid dangerous climate change, some major recent announcements have given cause to celebrate. Last month, the world’s two largest emitters – the U.S. and China – reached a deal to tackle emissions. Then, the U.S., Japanese, and UK governments joined others by pledging billions to the Green Climate Fund to help developing nations deal with climate change. These political announcements are clearly timed to inject momentum into the negotiations taking place in Lima. But key questions remain unanswered: What do these financial pledges mean in terms of existing investment in a low-carbon economy future? How should money be spent? And are we on the right track?

At Climate Policy Initiative, our analysis of global climate finance flows helps to identify who is investing in climate action on the ground, how, and whether investments are keeping up what is needed to transform the global economy. We have just released the latest edition of our Global Landscape of Climate Finance report. It shows global climate finance has fallen for the second year running and we are falling further behind the level of investment needed to keep global temperature rise below two degree Celsius – but reveals some positive news as well.

Firstly, that nations around the world are investing in a low-carbon future in line with national interests. Last year, climate finance investments were split almost equally between developed and developing countries, with USD 164 billion and USD 165 billion respectively. With almost three-quarters of total investments being made in their country of origin, the majority of climate finance investments are motivated by self-interest—either for governments or businesses. Motivations include increasing economic productivity and profit, meeting growing energy demand, improving energy security, reducing health costs associated with pollution, and managing climate risk including investment risks.

Secondly, that getting domestic policy settings right offers the best opportunity to unlock new investment. When policy certainty and public resources balance risks and rewards effectively, private money follows. In 2013, private investments made up 58% of global climate finance with the vast majority (90%) of these being made at home where the risk to reward ratio is perceived relatively favorably. Addressing the needs of domestic investors offers the greatest potential to unlock investment at the necessary scale. This is not to say that international and domestic public policies, support and finance don’t have complementary roles to play. It is significant, for instance, that almost all of the developed to developing country finance we capture in our inventory of climate finance flows came from public actors. But ultimately, it is getting domestic policy frameworks right, with international support where appropriate, that will drive most of the necessary investment from domestic and international sources.

Thirdly, that despite a fall in overall investment, money is going further than ever. While investment fell for the second year running, this is largely because of decreased private investment resulting from falling costs of solar PV and other renewable energy technologies. In some cases, deployment of these technologies is staying steady or even growing, even though finance is shrinking. In 2013, investment in solar fell by 14% but deployment increased by 30%. Technological innovation is reducing costs and because of this renewable energy investments in some markets are cheaper than the fossil fuel alternatives, particularly in Latin America. Achieving more output for less input is one of the basic foundations of economic growth, so this is great news. From solar PV, to energy efficiency and agricultural productivity, growing numbers of low-carbon investments are competing with or cheaper than their high-carbon counterparts. This despite a highly uneven playing field in which global subsidies to fossil fuels continue to dwarf support for renewables and where carbon prices do not reflect the true costs of emitting CO2.

So what do our findings mean for the recent China/U.S. deal and Green Climate Fund pledges? Increasing political pressure on other countries to keep pace in terms of their domestic action and international commitments is an encouraging sign as the deadline nears for finalizing a new global climate agreement in Paris just one year from now. Reaching a global accord offers the best prospect for tackling climate change. But we must recognize that international agreements are themselves, guided by collective national interests. There is clear recognition that international public resources should complement and supplement national resources where these are insufficient. But if we are to bridge the investment gap they should also be focused on finding ways to lower costs, boost returns and reduce risks for private actors. Public finance alone will not be enough to meet the climate finance challenge.

Many private investors are ready to act. In September, over 300 institutional investors from around the world representing over $24 trillion in assets called on government leaders to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and implement the kind of carbon pricing policies that will enable them to redirect trillions to investments compatible with fighting climate change. Businesses and citizens are investing, and technological innovation means more and more investments are making economic and environmental sense. Accompanying innovation with policy, appropriately targeted finance and new business models can build the momentum and economies of scale to make the low-carbon transition achievable. The low-carbon transition isn’t just a way of reducing climate risk, it also represents a huge investment opportunity.

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The Clean Power Plan means changes for coal, but not the ones you might expect

June 18, 2014 |

 

Under President Obama’s recently announced Clean Power Plan, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed that states cut greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants by 30 percent from 2005 levels.

Commenters on both sides of the aisle say this rule means big changes for the coal industry.

But before we get fired up about the changes, it’s important to take a look at the facts: While states will need to retire coal plants at the end of their useful lives to meet the proposed limits, EPA’s rule would give states a great amount of flexibility to avoid coal asset stranding and still meet emissions reduction targets. In fact, valuing the right services from coal plants will prove the more important question for a low-cost, low-carbon electricity system.

Let’s look at why.

First, we need to understand what the rule really means for coal asset stranding. An asset is “stranded” if a reduction in its value (that is, value to investors) is clearly attributable to a policy change that was not foreseeable by investors at the time of investment.

In our upcoming analysis of stranded assets, Climate Policy Initiative finds that if no new investments are made in coal power plants and existing plants retire as planned (typically, 60 years for plants with pollution control technology investments and 40 years for plants without), the U.S. coal power sector stands to experience approximately $28 billion of value stranding from plants that are shut down. While that’s a big sounding number at first glance, it’s very small relative to the size of coal power sector. As the figure shows, that retirement schedule puts the U.S. coal power sector on track to come close to the coal power capacity reductions called for in the IEA 450 PPM scenario to limit global temperature increase to 2°C.

U.S. Coal Power w emissions (2)

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Indian concentrated solar power policy delivers a world-leading CSP plant but still needs adjustment

June 5, 2014 |

 

Solar power is one of the most promising options for India to meet its growing electricity demand. While the construction of further fossil fuel power plants is slowing due to lower domestic coal production than expected and the high cost of fuel imports, installations of solar plants are on the rise.

As discussed in a CPI blog, the Government of India’s National Solar Mission, started in 2010, has achieved targets for promoting solar photovoltaic (PV), having seen 660 MW deployed by January 2014. However, plans to deploy concentrated solar power (CSP) – a less mature and currently more expensive alternative with key technological advantages that allow it to deliver power reliably and when it is needed – did not meet with the same success. Over the same period, the government tendered 500 MW of CSP but successful bidders have only installed 10% of this deployment target to date.

In the coming days, however, the National Solar Mission takes an important step forward in its CSP efforts, when the 100MW Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP plant – the largest CSP plant built so far in India and the largest worldwide using linear Fresnel technology – is connected to the grid. In a recent CPI case study, financed by the Climate Investment Funds Admin Unit, Climate Policy Initiative examined this plant to understand why this project was implemented, while others under the National Solar Mission are still delayed. Some of our key findings include:

  • The Government of India’s measures, including awarding a subsidized power purchase agreement (PPA) and payment security scheme through a competitive reverse auction, were essential to getting the Rajasthan plant built but they were not enough to deploy CSP at the desired scale. Indeed, the only winning bidders able to build CSP plants at the low tariffs that resulted from the competitive bidding process were those that had financially strong private stakeholders and were able to source public debt. The 100MW Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP plant, for instance, benefitted from USD 280mn of long-term foreign public debt, a project developer both willing to take risks to establish itself in the Indian CSP market and willing and able to accept low returns, and a technology provider that contributed comprehensive warrantees.
  • India’s CSP policy kept costs to the public low but it will need adjustment to increase the certainty and speed of deployment and meet the country’s ambition to establish a national solar industry. Strong competition among project developers resulted in several submitting bids at prices that put them among the cheapest CSP tariffs worldwide (see also our previous paper on the global CSP landscape). However, project delays, possible cancellations, and difficulties in sourcing technologies and financing experienced by several of these developers – due in part to the challenge of building at such low tariffs – meant India was unable to meet its CSP targets and capitalize more fully on learning-by-doing, establishment of local supply chains, and investments in basic infrastructure, as developed during the implementation of projects like Rajasthan Sun Technique.

If a reverse auctioning scheme is used in India for future scale up of CSP, the design could be substantially improved and the Indian government could increase the likelihood of timely project implementation by:

  • Including stricter qualification requirements for bidders in terms of CSP experience and financial strength
  • Setting out more realistic timelines for bidding
  • Making reliable on-site solar irradiation data available
  • Allowing sufficient time for construction but also then enforcing penalties more strongly for delayed projects

With the 100MW Rajasthan Sun Technique plant commissioning, Indian CSP policy takes an important step forward but there is still a way to go before large scale up of the technology allows the country to balance the cheaper but fluctuating solar PV and wind power with more reliable CSP plants.

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